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We examine the efforts of transition economies to deal with financial fragility and resolve 
banking cries  We characterize the birthing process of banking in transition and the three 
essential features of banking crises in transition economies: (i) bad loans and the relation-
ship to state owned industries, (ii) development of institutional infrastructure and (iii) 
credible commitments to resolution and privatization.  We then discuss the  experiences of 
seven important transition countries in order to identify the salient features of their efforts 
to resolve banking crises.   
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Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan, miten siirtymätalouksissa on hoidettu rahoitusjärjestelmien 
haavoittuvuutta sekä pankkikriisejä. Aluksi käydään läpi siirtymätalouksien pankkijärjes-
telmien syntyvaiheet. Siirtymätalouksien pankkikriiseistä löytyy kolme yhteistä tekijää: 1) 
huonojen lainojen yhteys valtion omistamiin yrityksiin, 2) instituutioiden hidas kehitys ja 
3) valittuun politiikkaan sitoutumisen uskottavuuden merkitys pankkikriisin ratkaisulle ja 
pankkien yksityistämiselle. Pankkikriisien ratkaisua tutkitaan seitsemässä tärkeässä siirty-
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1  Introduction  
 
The resolution of bank crises in the transition economies, at least until the late 1990s, dif-
fers from resolution elsewhere.  Transition banking experienced a birthing stage in which a 
decentralized private banking system was carved out of the vestiges of a public monobank 
structure.   The banks carved out of the state monobank were often undercapitalized and, 
most importantly, were expected to support the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the 
evolving market economy.  Furthermore, the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) we-
re often joined by poorly capitalized and loosely regulated new entrants.  In essence, the 
birthing process provided the seeds of banking crisis.  However, calling transition banking 
a special case begs the issue of understanding how these countries corrected the situation 
relatively quickly.  Although the transition experiences in dealing with financial fragility 
were often costly and sometimes drawn out by a slow learning process, most countries in 
the region now have remarkably strong banking systems.   
  In this paper, we examine the experiences of transition economies with financial 
fragility.  In the first section, we characterize the birthing process and the three essential 
features of banking crises in transition economies.  In the next section, we examine the ex-
periences of seven important transition countries in order to identify the salient features of 
their efforts to resolve banking crises.  Our reflections on these experiences are found in a 
concluding section.   
 
 
2  Banking in transition countries: The birthing process 
 
Banking sectors in transition economies (TEs) underwent a birthing stage in which a de-
centralized private banking system was carved out of the vestiges of a public monobank 
structure. In some TEs, a single new bank assumed the entire commercial portfolio of the 
monobank; in others, several new commercial banks were born.  In addition, one or more 
large specialty banks existed having monopolies over their respective core activities, e.g., a 
savings bank for primary deposits and a foreign trade bank for all foreign currency transac-
tions.  The resulting state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) were undercapitalized and 
expected to support the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the evolving market economy. 
In addition, entry requirements were relatively lax to induce domestic competition so that John Bonin and Paul Wachtel       Dealing with financial fragility in transition ecomies 
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poorly capitalized and loosely regulated private entrants added to the seeds of banking cri-
ses.   
  Governments in the TEs faced three interrelated major tasks in developing efficient 
banking sectors from this embryo. First, most of the SOCBs were insolvent.  Prior to tran-
sition, loans were not made according to market criteria so that many of the existing assets 
held by these banks became non-performing in the market economy.  In addition, the situa-
tion was exacerbated at the outset of transition by governments that were eager to eliminate 
fiscal deficits. They eliminated fiscal subsidies to SOEs, which turned to their SOCBs for 
financial support.  Therefore, the first task for developing independent banking sectors was 
to correct the incentives that generated bad lending and to make transparent the financing 
of government policies.   
Bank insolvency has two components, namely the stock of inherited bad loans and 
the flow of new bad loans.  To prevent the recurrence of insolvency, any resolution pro-
gram must remove from the banks both the incentives to make bad loans and the impedi-
ments that prevent them from extricating themselves from weak clients.  To the extent that 
SOCBs are unable to shed SOEs that cannot perform profitably in the market environment, 
providing financial support for these clients insures that bad loans will continue to impact 
adversely the solvency of SOCBs.   
The second task, creating the institutional and legislative infrastructure to support 
and facilitate the transition to a market economy, was of equal importance.  Without the 
supporting institutional and legislative infrastructure, neither the information nor the incen-
tives for resolving bank insolvencies are forthcoming.  Therefore, institution building is 
necessary although it is not sufficient.  Specifically, bankruptcy laws and accounting stan-
dards were required to change the behavior of economic agents who were accustomed to 
operating in the non-market environment and human capital development was needed to 
for effective implementation.  Proper attention must be given to the incentives of individ-
ual decision makers if the legislation is to be implemented successfully. Hence, any resolu-
tion program must be integrated carefully with the evolving institutional structure to avoid 
inconsistencies and unwarranted expectations.  Since the SOCBs held the predominant 
share of banking assets, the third task was  bank privatization.   
To avoid a moral hazard problem, the government must be able to commit credibly 
to a final resolution of the insolvency problem.  Multiple recapitalizations of SOCBs in the 
TEs were taken as evidence of an inability or unwillingness on the part of governments to BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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harden budget constraints on banks and, by association, their client SOEs.  In retrospect, a 
combination of the difficulties of recognizing the full extent of the problem due to the dy-
namics and a reluctance to allow banks to sever relationships with existing weak clients 
influenced significantly the policy options. 
The EBRD identifies 27 TEs (not counting China and the other Asian TEs) al-
though the group is probably no more alike than any random sampling of nations around 
the world.  Included are large countries, e.g. Russia, and extremely small countries, e.g. 
Slovenia and Estonia. Considerable differences in the level of development are observed 
from Central Europe to Central Asia leading to significant differences in banking systems.  
In order to provide an overview of the salient issues, we focus on seven TEs that have dif-
ferent characteristics and progress in bank restructuring.  We include the two largest TEs, 
namely, Russia and China, and we consider the TEs with the most developed banking sys-
tems, both at the start of transition and at the present, namely, Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic. In addition, we consider two other TEs with a long history of grappling 
with banking development, namely, Bulgaria and Romania.  Our choices do not include 
very small countries, those with idiosyncratic political situations (e.g. former Yugoslavia) 
or those with minimal extent of financial intermediation (e.g. some CIS republics).   
A stable macroeconomic environment is a necessary condition for effective finan-
cial intermediation.  Macroeconomic stabilization occurs when the transition shock to out-
put comes to an end and the inflation rate stabilizes below hyperinflation levels. Appendix 
Tables 1 and 2 show annual real GDP growth rates and inflation rates respectively for the 
seven countries in the seven countries discussed.  Using positive real growth and an infla-
tion rate of 50% as thresholds, we date macroeconomic stabilization as follows: Poland, 
1992; Czech Republic, 1993; Hungary, 1994; Russia, 1997;
i Bulgaria, 1998; and Romania, 
2000.  The birthing process for the banking system continued beyond the point of stabiliza-
tion in the earliest stabilizers, i.e., Poland and, particularly, the Czech Republic.  In the 
other countries, bank restructuring corresponded fairly closely with the date of macroeco-
nomic stabilization.  We will see in country discussions that there is a joint causality be-
tween bank restructuring and macroeconomic stabilization.  Each makes the other possible. 
An interesting exception is exception is China that experiences neither growth nor high 
inflation throughout the period and, interestinly, jas jus begun to restructure its banks. 
  The impact of a banking crisis or of a slow birthing process depends on the depth of 
financial intermediation in these countries.  A banking crisis has less impact on an econ-John Bonin and Paul Wachtel       Dealing with financial fragility in transition ecomies 
 
  10 
omy based on cash transactions than on one with extensive use of bank deposits.
ii  As long 
as the government has a mechanism in place for the distribution of currency, bank insol-
vencies have no systemic effect.
iii  Appendix Tables 3 and 4 provides annual data for two 
measures of financial depth, the ratio of M2 to GDP and the ratio of domestic credit to 
provided by the banking sector to GDP.  Hyperinflation at the start of  transition often re-
duced the extent of intermediation, particularly in Bulgaria and Romania.  Although these 
countries, and Russia as well, had very costly banking crises, they were able to start a mac-
roeconomic recovery quickly.  The Czech Republic and Hungary had deeper financial sys-
tems in the 1990s and therefore larger macroeconomic consequences of banking crises.  
Finally, China has a comparatively deep financial system and therefore may be vulnerable 
to the effects of any banking crisis that might occur.  Since banking crises and macroeco-
nomic contractions are occur simultaneously, we do not provide specific estimates of the 
macro consequences of each crisis.  However, efforts to restructure the banking system can 
be estimated.   
For estimates of the costs of bank restructuring programs, we draw on those found 
in Caprio and Klingbiel (2003), Tang et al. (2000) and Zoli (2001).   Bonin and Wachtel 
(2003) summarize banking developments in transition and Enoch et al. (2002) addresses 
the issue of resolution. 
 
 
3  Resolving bank crises in transition countries 
 
Poland.  A two-tier structure was established in 1989 resulting in a central bank, nine re-
gionally based  SOCBs and four specialty banks.  In 1991, the Polish government recapita-
lized banks to cover losses from the currency devaluation.  By 1993, non-performing loans 
were still 31% of total bank loans as banks continued to lend to their non-restructured SOE 
clients. With the support of the World Bank, the Polish government designed a bank-led, 
enterprise restructuring plan that linked bank privatization and recapitalization with bad-
debt workouts.  In addition, the agricultural bank BGZ, which is an umbrella for numerous 
agricultural cooperative banks, was recapitalized.  The government also made efforts to 
restructure the industry by orchestrating mergers through a bank consolidation program. 
Caprio and Klingbiel (2003) indicate that the cost of recapitalizing the seven commercial 
banks in 1993 was $750 million and the cost of recapitalizing the agricultural banks was BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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$900 million. Zoli (2001) estimates the total fiscal cost of all restructuring efforts in Poland 
at only 7.4% of GDP, most of which was due to initial recapitalizations in 1991.
iv    
Throughout this period, the payments system functioned with a few notable early 
problems due to the underdeveloped infrastructure for clearing checks among the regional 
banks.  In addition, financial depth did not decline and foreign participation, both 
greenfield and in the privatization process, began after 1995. The legal infrastructure, 
which was largely the pre-Communist commercial code because extensive legal reforms 
did not occur until the later 1990s, was adequate for the early development of the banking 
sector.  The central bank operated at arms length from bank restructuring and played an 
effective supervisory role.  By 1998, a majority of the banking system was private and, by 
the end of the following year, more than half of bank equity was foreign owned.   
The fundamental characteristic of the Polish approach to bank restructuring is that 
the responsibility for working out bad loans was retained by the banks, which were ex-
pected to promote enterprise restructuring.  The program was intended to build institutional 
capability in the banks and provide flexible enterprise restructuring without government 
interference.  The underlying presumptions were that the major bank creditor had sufficient 
information about their large SOE clients either to promote restructuring or to opt for liq-
uidation and that the banks had sufficient incentives to maximize debt collections.  Actual 
experiences indicate that restructuring dominated bankruptcy and that the main workout 
instrument used by the weaker banks was the debt-equity swap.  Bonin and Leven (2001) 
find that new credit extended to three large military-industrial clients by one SOCB in the 
program exceeded the total amount of the bank’s recapitalization and left it with more, 
rather than less, exposure to these clients.  Hence, Poland’s program strengthened, rather 
than severed the ties between banks and their undesirable clients and provided breathing 
room for weak SOEs to postpone painful restructuring.   
Hungary.  The birthing process in Hungary started with the establishment of the 
SOCBs in 1987 and a regulatory agency in 1992.  Although the initial steps were appropri-
ate, two sources of difficulty emerged.  First, lax entry standards resulted in the creation of 
many small and poorly capitalized or poorly run de novo banks that were responsible for 
several instances of fraud.  Many of the de novo banks became insolvent and were either 
closed or forced to merge with other institutions.  Although this experience threatened the 
stability of the financial system, no systemic crisis or explicit bailouts by the government 
or the central bank occurred.  Second, the establishment of the SOCBs did little to change John Bonin and Paul Wachtel       Dealing with financial fragility in transition ecomies 
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the relationship between banks and their traditional SOE customers, particularly because 
the banks were organized along sectoral lines. Bad loans by SOCBs to SOEs accumulated 
rapidly.  Moreover, improvements in accounting rules for classifying loans and new bank-
ruptcy legislation served to indicate that the bad loan problem was large and growing.
v   
In an initial effort to recapitalize banks in 1991, the Hungarian government ex-
tended loan guarantees for inherited bad loans.  The government bought loans and interest 
claims that totaled almost 3% of GDP and paid for them with specially issued bonds.  
About one-third of the loans were transferred to a factoring agency for workout and the 
rest was left with the banks to work out under contracts with the Ministry of Finance that 
restricted new lending.  
The Hungarian approach involved dealing with bank recapitalization, enterprise re-
structuring, and institutional development simultaneously.  During 1993, the government 
developed a program for the recapitalization of large (non-bank) SOEs.  The government 
bought or forgave debts of these enterprises and the banks received government bonds in 
excess of 1% of GDP as part of the program.  Nevertheless, the amount of bad or doubtful 
debt at the banks kept increasing and another comprehensive recapitalization followed at 
the end of 1993 when capital injections of more than $1 billion were made. The recipients 
included the three large SOCBs, which accounted for over half of the overdue credit in the 
banking system and were insolvent.  Later stages of the program in 1994 provided addi-
tional financing and incentives to deal with bad loan problems. The total amount provided 
was somewhat less than 2% of GDP and the three large commercial banks received over 
80% of the funds involved.  
Multiple recapitalizations of its SOCBs earned Hungary the dubious reputation at 
the time as being the country most oblivious to moral hazard. The first recapitalization was 
insufficient both because the instruments used were not sufficiently liquid or financially 
attractive and because the banks were still servicing bad clients. The second bank recapi-
talization was ultimately successful because soon afterwards Hungary adopted a policy of 
privatizing state banks by selling controlling shares to strategic foreign investors. The will-
ingness of the Hungarian government to sell large banks to strategic foreign owners pro-
vided the credible commitment of no further bank bailouts and hastened reforms in the re-
lationships between banks and SOEs.  Between mid-1994 and 1997, all of the Hungarian 
state owned banks were sold to foreign investors.  
 BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 22/ 2004 
 
  13 
The Hungarian experience points to the importance of SOCBs achieving independence 
both from the state and from undesirable clients. By the end of the 1990s, the Hungarian 
banking sector was the strongest in the region. The costs of the recapitalization programs 
in the 1990s amounted to 13% of 1998 GDP (Tang, et. al.).   
Although the Hungarian banking sector is largely well capitalized and controlled by 
foreigners, it has not been immune to banking crises. A few small banks have been liqui-
dated without any direct cost to the government because the deposit insurance agency cov-
ered the deposits.  In 1997, a run on the sixth largest bank resulted in its nationalization 
and the subsequent dismissal of the bank’s management for fraudulent behavior.   It con-
tinued to accumulated losses and cost the government 1.7% of GDP (not included in the 
above total costs).  The bank was privatized in 2003 for about 2.75 times its book value 
illustrating the resiliency of the mature Hungarian banking system to resolve successfully a 
banking crisis and avoid systemic problems.  
Czech Republic.  Working capital of SOEs in Czechoslovakia was funded by short-
term, low-interest, revolving bank credit (TOZ loans).  All of these loans were transferred 
to a hospital bank and the large SOCBs were freed of bad loans accumulated before 1991.  
This restructuring program cost about $750 million or less than 1% of GDP.  About one 
third of the funds went to capital infusions to the large banks and the rest was related to the 
takeover of bad loans.  However, the SOE clients remained with their parent banks that 
continued to provide banking services and new loans.  To encourage competition, privati-
zation, and expansion, all banks were given refinancing credits by the central bank.   
Three of the largest four banks in the Czech Republic participated in the first wave of 
voucher privatization in 1992.  Investment funds, the largest of which were created by these 
banks, were an integral part of the Czech voucher privatization program.  Hence, this initial 
divestiture of state holdings in banks and companies resulted in an interlocking ownership 
of banks and clients in which the state retained large controlling stakes of the privatized 
banks. The banks maintained their long-standing soft-lending relationships with their 
voucher-privatized enterprise clients and through the bank-owned privatization funds now 
held an equity interest in these firms.  Voucher privatization strengthened the relationships 
between banks and their clients and contributed to rapid deterioration of the banks’ balance 
sheets.   In addition, the existence of the state-owned hospital bank made it impossible for 
the government to commit credibly to end further bank bailouts.  Moreover, tax laws that 
restricted write offs and laws that restricted the ability of banks to sell collateral contrib-John Bonin and Paul Wachtel       Dealing with financial fragility in transition ecomies 
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uted to the growth of bad loans.  Although the situation was quickly apparent, several years 
passed before any meaningful efforts were made to resolve the problems. 
In the interim, many small and medium-sized banks encountered liquidity prob-
lems, which led to additional resolution programs (Matousek and Taci, 2002). At the end 
of 1995, a second consolidation program involved closures, liquidations, and mergers of 
many small and medium-sized banks with the central bank acting as lender of last resort to 
keep open some of the banks in receivership.  Although the 18 banks in this program rep-
resented only 9% of bank assets, fear that a systemic bank crisis provided the rationale for 
the government’s policy.  The program cost to the central bank was 2% of 1996 GDP.  
In the summer of 1996, a run on Agrobanka, the fifth largest bank at the time, re-
sulted in liquidity support of over $500 million.  The government provided liquidity by 
buying bad assets at face value if the bank agreed to improvements in management, devel-
oped a workout plan, reduced risky activity such as securities trading, and obtained infu-
sions of capital from the owners.  An additional $500 million was committed to the pro-
gram.   
Finally, during 1996 and 1997, a stabilization program covering bad loans in the 
large banks was enacted to deal with solvency issues. As a consequence of the recapitaliza-
tion programs, the government once again became the majority owner of the four large 
Czech banks.  Neither the creation of a separate hospital bank for bad loans nor several 
rounds of cleaning up the banks’ balance sheets had made the big four Czech banks strong 
financial institutions.  In 1997, the government belatedly adopted a strategy of selling the 
banks by auction to foreign strategic investors.  The first such sale was the purchase in 199 
of Investicni a Postovni Banka (IPB) by Nomura.  Nomura took no active role in reforming 
the bank choosing instead to tunnel value from the bank’s investment funds.  Large loan 
losses led to a run on deposits and IPB was taken over by the central bank. The central 
bank provided a guarantee against future loan losses and removed a further $2.5 billion of 
bad loans from IPB.   
Extensive banking system problems persisted throughout the 1990s in the Czech 
Republic, well after other Hungary and Poland had established mature banking systems.  In 
1999, 30.6% of all bank loans were non-performing (Caprio and Klingbiel, 1999).  The 
privatizations of the three large Czech banks were preceded by loan transfers to the hospi-
tal bank, which totaled more than 3% of GDP.  Privatization revenues provided some par-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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tial offset and in one case, the government provided guarantees against future losses from 
inherited loans as part of the privatization deal.   
Tang et. al. (2000)  calculates the present value of restructuring costs in 1998 as  
4.8% of 1998 GDP for the central bank, mainly from the second consolidation program in 
1997, and 20.6% of 1998 GDP for the government, mainly from the initial capital infusion 
in 1991 and the purchase of bad loans in the early 1990s.  However, the hospital bank, 
which is the principal asset management company in the Czech Republic, has a poor re-
cord of collecting debts, has borrowed from the central bank, and has government guaran-
tees.  Any further losses incurred by the hospital bank could increase the costs of bank 
resolution in the Czech Republic, which is already far greater than the costs incurred in 
Hungary or Poland.  
Bulgaria.  At the start of transition there were a large number of state-owned banks 
in Bulgaria, both sectoral banks and regional commercial banks.  Following a voluntary 
merger of 22 of the former credit branches of the central bank to form United Bulgarian 
Bank (UBB), government-orchestrated restructuring began with the formation of the Bank 
Consolidation Company in 1993 (Bonin, 2004).   However, two impediments to banking 
sector developed persisted.  First, enterprise reform lagged and support for SOEs shifted 
from the budget to quasi-fiscal subsidies through the banking system.  Second, banks rou-
tinely granted forex credits to enterprises without holding forex deposits and currency 
mismatch proved to be a serious problem for the solvency of the banking system.  In 1992, 
the government attempted to address the currency issue by providing banks with govern-
ment bonds denominated in dollars (ZUNKs) in return for loans.  However, responsibility 
for loan recovery remained with the banks.   
The initial efforts at bank restructuring in Bulgaria were an expensive failure.  In 
1993 and 1994, the costs were 10.9% and 23.1% of GDP, respectively.
vi Two of the sec-
toral banks and UBB required injections of liquidity from the central bank in 1995 and 
most of the SOCBs were insolvent.   About half of all loans in SOCBs were non-
performing but the political will and the legal framework to close down banks was lacking.  
Finally, in 1996, 19 banks accounting for almost one-third of banking assets were closed.  
In February 1997, a currency crisis erupted as the lev depreciated significantly.  A currency 
board, established in July 1997 to deal with the macroeconomic crisis, prohibited central 
bank lending and provided the credible commitment to no further bank bailouts.  From 
1996 to 1997, bank restructuring costs were shared by the government, through additional John Bonin and Paul Wachtel       Dealing with financial fragility in transition ecomies 
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loan for bond swaps, and the central bank, through losses on unsecured credits.  Total costs 
amounted to 9.9% and 4.1% of GDP in 1996 and 1997, respectively.  
Over the decade, the total cost of bank restructuring in Bulgaria was 41.6% of 
GDP, far larger than the cost for any other TE.
vii  Bank restructuring failed in Bulgaria for 
two primary reasons.  First, the incentive structure for banks was not changed because 
bond swaps for bad loans did not stem new lending to the same unreformed SOE clients. 
Second, the institutional framework for improving the banking system did not exist.  Pru-
dential regulations and supervision were not in place until 1997, several years later than in 
the other ETEs, and international accounting standards were not applied until 1998 (Tang, 
et al., 2000).  Neither the necessary institutional structure nor a credible commitment to 
abstain from further bailouts existed before the establishment of the currency board.  
Romania.  The birthing process in Romania resulted in one large commercial bank 
carved from the portfolio of the central bank, which joined four specialty banks.  The bal-
ance sheets of these state owned banks were deteriorating from the start.  Efforts at macro-
economic stabilization worsened the conditions of some of the banks.  Exchange rate liber-
alization and the elimination of subsidized agricultural credits led to financial distress at 
the foreign trade bank, Bancorex, and Banca Agricola due to accumulating bad debts from 
directed credits to the energy and agricultural sectors, respectively.  The two banks raised 
interest rates in 1997 in order to attract deposits and stave off runs, which affected the abil-
ity of the central bank to conduct monetary policy.  Late in 1997, the government bailed 
out the two banks with $1 billion in bonds, almost 3% of GDP that were then refinanced by 
the central bank.   At the end of 1998, over 50% of all bank credit was rated in the loss 
category and even more in Bancorex.  Clearly, the solvency of the entire Romanian bank-
ing system was at stake.  
The anticipated restructuring of the large foreign trade bank, Bancorex, never took 
place although a new management team was put in place. The IMF estimates that subse-
quent mismanagement and delay in restructuring the Bancorex doubled the cost to the pub-
lic of resolving the crisis. In February 1999, the government established a hospital bank to 
take over the bad debts from Bancorex and Banca Agricola.  Most of Bancorex’s loan port-
folio was transferred to the agency for workout; initially this amounted to about $1.7 bil-
lion or 5% of GDP.  However, the bank’s problems were insurmountable and Bancorex 
collapsed in April 1999 after a run by depositors even while efforts to restructure it were 
ongoing.  Since further recapitalization would require a fiscal outlay in excess of 5% of BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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GDP, the government decided to close Bancorex and merge the healthy part of its portfolio 
with the large state-owned commercial bank.  In addition, about $2 billion more in bad 
loans from Bancorex and Banka Agricola were transferred to the hospital bank. To avoid a 
systemic crisis, the central bank provided liquidity.  In addition, the government compen-
sated the commercial bank for deposit withdrawals and any balance sheet gap resulting 
from its absorbing Bancorex.    
From the beginning of 1997 through the end of 2000, the assets of the Romanian 
banking sector shrunk by about 50% in real terms.  Improved organization of bank super-
vision did not occur until late in 1999.  Romania was both slow to achieve macroeconomic 
stabilization and slow to recognize bank insolvencies.  Although privatizations to foreign 
investors have begun, the banking system remains fragile.  
Russia.  The two-tier banking system began in Russia (then Soviet Union) in 1987 
with the separation of commercial bank functions from Gosbank
viii and the creation of sec-
toral banks by enterprises or former branch ministries.  Sberbank, the state savings bank, 
held most household deposits, which were channeled directly through the state banks to 
enterprises.  New entry into Russian banking was dramatic; a few hundred banks were cre-
ated in 1988 and 1989 and the number of new banks increased by about 1,000 in 1990 and 
by another 1,000 shortly thereafter (Aslund, 1996). Most banks were small and poorly 
capitalized; some of them were merely house banks for enterprises although some later 
emerged as the largest commercial banks in Russia.  In addition, Russia’s banking system 
remained extremely thin throughout the 1990s; the extent of financial intermediation was 
low even by comparison with other TEs. 
Although the Russian banking system was immature, the financial crisis of 1998 
exhibited many classical causes.  First, asset stripping and excessive risk taking by banks 
occurred in an environment with little supervision of banks, no uniform accounting stan-
dards, and a willingness of the central bank to provide liquidity to the banking system.  
Second, balance sheet expansion involved both currency and maturity mismatches as the 
banks bought long-term, high-interest, ruble assets with short-term, and often low-interest 
dollar-denominated liabilities.  Although there was little effort at risk management, the 
banks remained solvent under Russian accounting standards and prudential regulations. 
Non-performing loans were reported to be only 19% of total loans in 1997, which was no 
higher than in the European TEs and less than in some of the Asian countries that experi-
enced a banking crisis at the same time. However, because of the absence of effective John Bonin and Paul Wachtel       Dealing with financial fragility in transition ecomies 
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regulation and a program for restructuring, much of the Russian banking system was in 
serious difficulty even prior to the government debt crisis of 1998.  
The banking crisis only became apparent when the fiscal crisis caused the govern-
ment to suspend payments on its debt, which resulted in the collapse of the ruble. Bank 
withdrawals led to an immediate shortage of liquidity. Small banks suffered due to their 
ties to the large banks and the withdrawal of central bank liquidity after the collapse of the 
Ruble. The central bank responded by allowing banks to draw on required reserve deposits 
for payments and by offering stabilization credits to banks. To forestall a bank run, banks 
were encouraged to shift 50% of their ruble deposits and 10% of their foreign currency de-
posits to Sberbank, which was thought to enjoy full implicit deposit insurance because the 
central bank is its majority shareholder.  As the transfer of deposits to Sberbank continued, 
the quality of its balance sheet deteriorated because it was required to adopt international 
accounting standards (IMF, 2003) 
The full extent of the solvency problem in the banking system was realized in sub-
sequent months, particularly as pressure from international financial institutions led to 
closer scrutiny of the banks. The Russian authorities agreed to conduct due diligence re-
views using Western accounting standards for 18 of the largest banks accounting for about 
one-half of banking assets outside of state-controlled banks.  Legal reforms involving 
bankruptcy and banking laws to facilitate restructuring and rehabilitation of banks were 
begun and a commitment was made to strengthen the supervisory capacity of the central 
bank.  However, restrictions on foreign participation in banking remained in place. The 
number of banks operating in Russia decreased due to closures and consolidations.  More 
importantly, total credit and the real money supply contracted sharply.   The credit contrac-
tion did not have a larger effect on the economy because of the low level of financial in-
termediation at the time. 
Progress at bank restructuring was slow because the authorities delayed taking ac-
tions under the new legislation which only came into effect in mid-1999 and which also 
encouraged delays.  An agency for restructuring problem banks, ARCO, was established 
but the rules invited procrastination.  A bank that fulfilled certain criteria as to size and the 
nature of their problems had to be referred to ARCO by the central bank.  ARCO decides 
whether to manage or liquidate the problem bank (Chekurova, 2001). The rules are full of 
contradictions, e.g. ARCO takes on the rights of shareholders at an annual meeting but it 
may only replace management for one month.   Furthermore, although ARCO was respon-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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sible for the restructuring program, only the central bank could withdraw a banking li-
cense. ARCO had few resources available so it appeared that the government intended to 
liquidate rather than restructure the large banks.  In addition, the interests of individual de-
positors were disregarded during liquidation as most of the money in the banks was re-
moved shortly before the process began. Caprio and Klingbiel (2003) estimate that the cost 
of a full bailout of Russian banks was $15 billion or between 5% and 7% of GDP. 
Observers of Russian banking noted immediately the problems with the Russian 
approach to bank restructuring.  First, the limited resources available meant that potentially 
efficient banks were liquidated, probably by design (Thiesen, 2000).  Second, the potential 
contribution of foreign financial institutions was ignored (Buch and Heinrich, 1999).   
Third, ARCO itself had little authority to change bank operations and incentives once a 
restructuring took place.   
Although the post-1998 changes were a sharp departure from the wildcat approach 
to banking that had prevailed, no comprehensive plan for restructuring, no clear and 
prompt application of prudential rules, and no introduction of private (foreign) capital with 
the proper incentives were forthcoming (World Bank, 2002). Even if Western prudential 
standards had been applied to Russian banks prior to 1998, the fiscal crisis would have 
precipitated a banking crisis because the banks were large holders of government debt.  
Nonetheless, the government’s response was inadequate and its mismanagement added to 
the public perception of the fragility of Russian banks.   
The Russian experience provides the best illustration of the importance of having 
an adequate institutional framework in place. In Russia, the necessary legislation did not 
exist nor was the commitment to utilize the existing legal structure or the ability to apply 
existing law forthcoming.  In addition, the central bank did not act quickly to begin bank 
restructuring, even in situations in which it had the authority to do so. Although there are 
ample reasons to criticize the highly politicized and inconsistent approach to bank restruc-
turing taken by the Russian authorities after the 1998 crisis, the banking system did re-
bound remarkably in the post-crisis years.   
   China.   China has only recently begun to deal with the problem of non-
performing loans in its four large SOCBs, which account for more than two-thirds of both  
domestic credits to the non-financial sector and household deposits. Throughout the 1980s 
and in the first half of the 1990s, bank loans to GDP increased from 50% to 120%.  The 
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their profits and losses but it also contained language that required banks to conduct lend-
ing in accordance with the government’s industrial policy.  If the latter directive is in con-
flict with the former, SOCBs cannot be held fully responsible for lending decisions. By 
1996, loss-making SOEs were predominant so that the consolidated financial position of 
the state sector was negative.  During this period, the government explicitly sought finan-
cial support from the SOCBs in the form of policy loans that accounted for more than one-
third of total bank loans in the 1990s (Bonin and Huang, 2001). 
The Chinese government began to address the bad loan problem in 1994 by creat-
ing three banks to take over policy lending.  By 2000, the policy banks accounted for over 
12% of bank loans in China.  In 1999, the Chinese government established four asset man-
agement companies (AMCs), one associated with each of the four large SOCBs, to deal 
with non-performing loans amounting initially to about 19% of the total loans on the books 
of SOCBs.  By attaching each AMC to a large SOCB, the Chinese government created an 
incentive problem. Even though a sunset provision has been imposed on the AMCs, a 
SOCB is likely to view its AMC as a bin into which bad loans can be discarded continu-
ously.  Simultaneously, the government has been pursuing a program of restructuring and 
downsizing SOEs.  Hence, the clients of the SOCBs are becoming stronger financially. At 
the same time, the private sector is growing rapidly, providing banks with healthy potential 
clients.  Current Western estimates indicate that the totality of bad loans in banks and 
AMCs constitute about 40% of GDP.  To what extent China can grow out of this bad loan 
problem and to what extent the large SOCBs will require considerable recapitalization is 
an ongoing concern for the government. 
In many TEs, privatization of SOCBs to majority foreign owners established an 
arms-length regulatory relationship between the government and the banks and provided 
credibility to the no-bailout commitment. The four large Chinese banks will not be privat-
ized in this way in the foreseeable future. In addition, Chinese banks are protected from 
outside competition because the capital account remains closed and operations of foreign 
financial firms are limited, despite China’s recent entry into the WTO. Hence, considerable 
institution building and gradual divesting of government stakes in the SOCBs by sales in 
the stock market must be combined to impose the necessary financial discipline on China’s 
four large banks. The final cost of the eventual resolution of bank insolvencies in China is 
likely to be toward the upper range for the TEs and may be as large as 40% of GDP. 
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4  Conclusion 
 
The experiences with bank resolution in the transition countries are related to peculiar as-
pects of the transition and to idiosyncrasies of a particular country’s banking sector; none-
theless several overall lessons can be drawn. First, insolvency will continue to plague the 
banking system so long as the incentive structure that encourages banks to support weak 
SOEs is not changed. By its nature, banking is a relational business and bad relationships 
are hard to break; removing inherited bad loans from banks is less important than freeing 
banks from inherited bad clients. Czech voucher privatization strengthened the ties be-
tween weak enterprises and their banks; in contrast, although the Hungarian program in-
volved multiple recapitalizations of banks, it addressed the issue of bad relationships.  As a 
result, the Czech Republic took over a decade to deal with soft lending whereas Hungary 
moved relatively quickly to change the incentive structure in banks by selling banks to for-
eign owners. Thus, the final cost of bank resolution in the Czech Republic was more than 
double that in Hungary.  
Second, the method chosen to deal with bad loan problems can reinforce the bad re-
lationships that are responsible for insolvency problems.  Bank involvement with workouts 
is likely to perpetuate the relationship to the bad customer, as the Polish experience indi-
cates.  However, establishing a hospital bank or an asset management company to workout 
the bad loans creates a moral hazard dilemma because of the expectation of further gov-
ernment- financed purchases of bad loans. The Czech Republic fell victim to this trap and 
China appears to be doing the same because the asset management companies are associ-
ated with a particular bank. Therefore, neither a centralized hospital bank solution nor a 
decentralized program leaving responsibility for bad loan workout with the banks is a pa-
nacea.   
Third, repeated recapitalizations strengthened direct ties between the government 
and banks making a credible commitment to arms-length regulation difficult.  Hungary 
used the sale of the banks to foreign investors to remove the government from bank-client 
relationship. The establishment of a currency board in Bulgaria provided a credible legal 
constraint on bailout activity that was strengthened by subsequent rapid sales of the banks 
to foreigners. Continued state-ownership of banks invites ongoing government intervention 
and impairs the ability of regulators to act independently. The conflict of interest faced by 
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ship of the four large Chinese banks are prime examples. Continued state-ownership of the 
savings banks in Romania and Poland, an agricultural bank in Poland, and the largest 
commercial bank in Romania also permit these governments to pursue industrial policy 
through banks to the detriment of effective regulation.   
Fourth, institutions matter but formal legislation is less important than the ability to 
implement vigorously equitable and transparent supervision.  The absence of prudential 
institutions or the lack of skills among regulators impeded crisis resolution in the Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Russia.  Finally, resolving bank crisis in transition countries is only weakly 
related to macroeconomic performance.  In the Czech Republic, Romania, Russia, and Po-
land, economic growth resumed before bank insolvencies were fully resolved.  In addition, 
China has an exemplary record of high growth and low inflation.  On the other hand, in 
recent years, Hungary has grown faster than the Czech Republic and Poland while Bulgaria 
has grown slightly faster than Romania. Hence, experiences in the transition countries lend 
weak support to the thesis that the failure to address financial fragility is a deterrent to sus-
tainable economic growth.     BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Appendix tables 
 
Table 1: Real GDP growth rates 
 
 Bulgaria  Czech  Republic  Hungary Poland  Romania  Russia China 
1990  n.a. n.a.  -3.5  -11.6  -5.6  n.a.  3.8 
1991  n.a. -11.5  -11.9  -7.0  -12.9  -5.0 9.2 
1992  n.a. -3.3  -3.1  2.6  -8.8  -14.5  14.2 
1993  -1.5  0.6  -0.6  3.8 1.5 -8.7 13.5 
1994  1.8  3.6  2.9  5.2 3.9  -12.7 12.6 
1995  2.9  5.9  1.5  7.0 7.1 -4.1 10.5 
1996  -9.4 4.3  1.3  6.0  3.9  -3.6  9.6 
1997  -5.6 -0.8  4.6  6.8  -6.1  1.4  8.8 
1998  4.0 -1.0  4.9  4.8  -4.8  -5.3  7.8 
1999  2.3 0.5 4.2  4.1  -1.2  6.3  7.1 
2000  5.4 3.3 5.2  4.0  2.1  10.0  8.0 
2001  4.1 3.1 3.8  1.0  5.7  5.1  7.5 
2002  4.9 2.0 3.5  1.4  5.0  4.7  8.0 





Table 2: Inflation rates 
Annual average % change in consumer prices  
 
 Bulgaria  Czech  Republic  Hungary Poland  Romania  Russia China 
1990    n.a.  n.a.  28.9  600.0  n.a.  n.a.  18.8 
1991  419.2 n.a. 34.2  76.6  133.3  n.a.  3.6 
1992  91.3 11.1  23.0  45.3  225.0  n.a.  6.3 
1993  72.8 20.8  22.4  36.9  250.5  890.0  14.6 
1994  96.0 9.9  18.8  33.2  137.9  307.6  24.2 
1995  62.1 9.2  28.3  28.0  32.1  197.4  17.1 
1996  121.6 8.8  23.4  19.8  39.0  47.7  8.3 
1997  1058.4 8.4  18.3  15.1  154.7  14.8  2.8 
1998  18.7 10.6  14.2  11.7  59.2  27.7  -0.8 
1999  2.6 2.1  10.0  7.3  45.8  85.7  -1.5 
2000  10.3 3.9  9.8  10.1  45.6  20.8  0.4 
2001  7.4 4.7  9.2  5.5  34.5  21.5  0.7 
2002  5.8 1.8  5.3  1.9  22.5  15.8  -0.8 
2003  2.3 0.1  4.7  0.7  15.3  13.7  1.2 
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Table 3: M2/GDP 
 Bulgaria  China  Czech  Republic  Hungary  Poland Romania  Russia 
1990  n.a.  0.18  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1991  0.10  0.19  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1992  0.14  0.20  n.a.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1993  0.16  0.25  0.22  0.23 0.11 0.03 0.04 
1994  0.14  0.20  0.26  0.23 0.13 0.05 0.04 
1995  0.17  0.23  0.33  0.21 0.16 0.06 0.07 
1996  0.06  0.26  0.32  0.21 0.16 0.06 0.08 
1997  0.08  0.29  0.26  0.19 0.16 0.06 0.09 
1998  0.09  0.31  0.31  0.19 0.19 0.07 0.04 
1999  0.08  0.32  0.26  0.18 0.18 0.06 0.04 
2000  0.09  0.33  0.27  0.17 0.19 0.06 0.06 
2001  0.10  0.34  0.30  0.19 0.22 0.06 0.07 
2002  0.13  0.37  0.37  0.26 0.21 0.08 0.08 
2003  0.18  0.40  0.44  0.30 0.22 0.09 0.11 
 
 
Table 4: Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP)  
   Bulgaria  China 
Czech  
Republic Hungary  Poland  Romania Russia 
1990 .. 90.0  .. 105.5  19.5 79.7 .. 
1991 118.5  92.6  ..  101.4  34.8  62.4  .. 
1992 120.7  92.0  ..  96.2  38.2  31.7  .. 
1993 133.1 103.2  74.3  97.0  40.6  21.2  25.9 
1994 103.5  92.2  75.9  93.1  36.7  18.5  31.7 
1995 68.8 91.2  75.9  82.3 32.0  23.6 25.5 
1996 108.7  97.8  72.2  72.1  33.2  28.9  27.8 
1997 20.8  106.8  72.3  66.2 34.1  18.7 29.5 
1998 15.6  121.9  64.2  62.9 35.1  21.7 44.9 
1999 15.3  130.4  59.7  52.7 37.6  17.9 33.3 
2000 17.8  132.7  54.5  54.7 34.1  14.0 24.7 
2001 20.2  138.6  49.4  50.1 36.2  12.2 25.3 
2002 23.7  166.4  45.8  53.0 36.2  13.2 26.6 
2003 ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Sources:  Tables 1-3: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
   Table 4: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI)
  
 
                                                 
i  Although Russia experiences an episode of negative real growth and high inflation in 1998, the main cause of this re-
trenchment is the financial crisis. 
ii  All the transition countries have much less developed financial systems than other countries at the same level of eco-
nomic development (Fries and Taci, 2001). 
iii  This was the situation in many of the least developed TEs, which is one reason that we do not examine bank restruc-
turing in countries like Armenia or Kyrgyzstan 
iv Zoli’s estimate appears to ignore the continued and ongoing fiscal support for the state-owned savings bank and agri-
cultural bank.   
v Abel (2002) provide more information on Hungarian banking. 
vi All the figures here are present values in 1998 as a percent of 1998 GDP, as calculated by Tang, et. al. (2000).  
vii  Of course, a country must have a significant banking sector to incur large restructuring costs.  If fiscal transfers finan-
ced by monetary expansion are used to support loss-making enterprises, as in Ukraine, explicit bank restructuring costs 
may not be incurred.  However, the economy still suffers efficiency losses and costs from macroeconomic instability.   
viii With the exception of Sberbank, the former state-owned banks went through a metamorphosis during privatization as 
branches became independent entities and then regrouped into larger banks.   BOFIT Discussion Papers  http://www.bof.fi/bofit 
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